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Abstract
Affectively speaking, I think that words can be much more harmful than actions. There’s a sting in words
which no action can replicate (Cummins J Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1168).
The opening quote to this article reflects a legal moment in which there is a movement or passage from
the dead body to the legal text. The above statement was made by Cummins J during legal argument in
the absence of the jury in Leonboyer, a case I observed. Counsel for the defence had asked his Honour to
make a ruling that the partial defence of provocation be left for the jury on the ground that words allegedly
spoken by the deceased caused the defendant, her fiancé, to feel insulted and lose all self-control. While
under the influence of that loss of self-control, he inflicted at least 24 stab wounds to her head, back,
groin and shoulder thereby causing her death. The words allegedly spoken by the deceased were that she
had been ‘fucking’ another man, which she followed with a taunt, in Spanish, about the defendant’s sexual
prowess (‘he did it better than you did’).
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Rewriting the event of murder:
Provocation, automatism and the law’s
use of a narrative of insult
Danielle Tyson1
Introduction:
the dead body at the scene of writing
Affectively speaking, I think that words can be much more harmful than
actions. There’s a sting in words which no action can replicate (Cummins
J Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1168).

The opening quote to this article reflects a legal moment in which
there is a movement or passage from the dead body to the legal text.2
The above statement was made by Cummins J during legal argument
in the absence of the jury in Leonboyer, a case I observed. Counsel for
the defence had asked his Honour to make a ruling that the partial
defence of provocation be left for the jury on the ground that words
allegedly spoken by the deceased caused the defendant, her fiancé, to
feel insulted and lose all self-control. While under the influence of
that loss of self-control, he inflicted at least 24 stab wounds to her
head, back, groin and shoulder thereby causing her death. The words
allegedly spoken by the deceased were that she had been ‘fucking’
another man, which she followed with a taunt, in Spanish, about the
defendant’s sexual prowess (‘he did it better than you did’).
His Honour was of the view that there were no authoritative cases
that established mere words as a sufficient ground to raise the defence
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of provocation therefore he did not intend to leave it as a matter for the
jury (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1142). To register his disagreement, counsel
for the defendant cited an Australian case from 1975 in which the
presiding judge left provocation to the jury on the ground of mere
words. In that case the defendant claimed to have been wounded by
the words spoken by his former spouse ‘at a time when he was under a
lot of stress’ and those words caused him to lose all self-control and
kill her. The alleged words were described as a ‘final rejection’ by the
defendant’s ‘angry spouse’ that took the form of ‘a statement that he
wasn’t going to see the children’ (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1146).
A short while later, the prosecuting counsel also sought to clarify
the question of whether there were any authoritative cases that
established words as a sufficient ground to raise the defence of
provocation (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1163). Citing the Victorian decisions
by the majority of the High Court in Moffa and the Court of Appeal in
Tuncay as cases in point, counsel for the crown outlined that ‘the
proposition that mere words cannot amount to provocation as a be all
and end all proposition is no longer correct’ (Leonboyer Nov 1999:
1166). He added: ‘it’s a question of looking at the words in the context
in which they are uttered’ (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1166). It was at this
point that his Honour replied, ‘Affectively speaking, I think that words
can be much more harmful than actions. There’s a sting in words, which
no action can replicate’ (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1168).3 Whereupon,
everyone seated in the courtroom — the prosecuting counsel, counsel
for the defendant, their respective solicitors, the judge’s associate,
including the tipstaff, and all of whom happened on that day to be male
— leaned back in their chairs and nodded their heads as if in solemn
agreement.
This exchange caused me some concern. What this scene illustrates
is that for the event of murder to have meaning, ‘if is to exist for us’, as
Young states, it must first ‘be articulated’ and like any and all events
will already ‘have been articulated in numerous contexts and in a variety
of ways’ (1997: 129). In making this (and not that) statement of the
case and which is contained in the maxim — ‘there’s a sting in words
which no action can replicate’ — we can see how the process of
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judgment involves drawing inferences from the ‘facts’ to delineate the
state of mind to prove murder, but also operates to deliver a narrative
which tells of the figurative wound from the speech of the deceased.
Specifically, this scene illustrates the scene of a disaster in murder
trials which is that the dead body cannot speak until it has the voice or
utterance of the other (Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush 2003: 210 fn
26). Or as Legendre has testified: how the dead body is only sayable in
‘the grip of the image’, a fiction, only then to be ‘captured by language’
(1997: 4). This article examines this scene within the larger context of
the murder trial to point to the law’s use and production of a narrative
of insult to make evident some of its dominant and socially harmful
effects. The article is concerned with the transcripts of trials in the
cases of Richardson4 and Leonboyer.5 The purpose in re-reading the
transcripts is to trace the deployment of metaphor and other literary
devices and generic narrative conventions that are used to understand
the situation to invoke an emotional response on the part of the audience
(the judge, jury and so on), and that also work to promote rather than
subvert a cultural habit of reading the event of murder in cases of
domestic homicide as the inevitable culmination of a ‘romance-gonewrong’. This is done with an eye to making evident the values and
assumptions that underpin the plot structure that organises the relation
between the subject and object of the narrative and that enables law to
conduct its reasoning.6
First, I discuss the trial transcript of Richardson (1997). On the
night of 3 January 1996, Alan Richardson stabbed his fiancée, Joanne
Campbell, 22 times to the front and back of her body thereby causing
her death. He was charged with murder. At his trial, his defence counsel
sought to convince the jury that the defendant lacked the requisite intent
for murder therefore they should find he was not guilty of murder. In
the alternative, the defence asked the jury to consider that he acted
under provocation and should be convicted of the lesser crime of
manslaughter. His claim that his culpability should be reduced was
made on the grounds of an utterance and an action about their upcoming
wedding, specifically, she is alleged to have said that the lack of a
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honeymoon meant there would be no point in having a wedding, at
which point she threw a box of wedding invitations at him.7
Second, I examine the trial of Leonboyer involving a defendant
who stabbed his girlfriend, Sandra Morales, 25 times on her head, back,
groin and shoulder. She died the next day and Leonboyer was charged
with murder. At his first trial, the defendant and his lawyer raised both
the defence of automatism and the partial defence of provocation.
However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the trial was aborted
(Leonboyer May 1999). At Leonboyer’s second trial (the case observed),
Cummins J ruled that the defence of provocation was not open for the
jury but that the defendant was entitled to raise the defence of
automatism (Leonboyer Nov 1999).8
In examining the trial transcripts from both these cases, I will
elucidate how the process of judgment operates to discursively construct
the character of the defendant and deceased, and to situate them within
what I have termed a narrative of insult in which feminine excess
(excessive speech and behaviour) is understood to drive wounded males
to restore their masculinity by killing their verbal antagonist. I will
further claim that the discursive process of emplotting events according
to a familiar storyline operates not only to frame the situation in terms
of coherence and plausibility but to drive the narrative forward towards
a conclusion with an air of inevitability — murder. What my reading
of these legal texts will demonstrate is that the law’s use and production
of this narrative is not only gendered, but is one that can be stretched
across law’s representation of the ‘facts’ to raise different questions of
legal doctrine while at the same time reproduce difference according
to the values of law.9

Law’s use and production of a narrative of
insult: The trial of Richardson
You can’t, as one of the barrister’s said, open someone’s mind and find out
what their intent is. How do you prove the existence of a particular intent?
The answer is by inference. ... You are entitled to infer an intent from all
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the circumstances, from what a person does, from what they say before,
from what they say afterwards. In all the circumstances in which you accept
you may draw the inferences that a person acted with a certain intent
(Richardson May 1997: 493).

Richardson was charged with the murder of his fiancée, Joanne
Campbell. In his record of interview with police he claimed that on the
night in question, whilst seated at the kitchen table of their home, an
argument developed between them. They shouted at each other over
whether or not they could afford a honeymoon. During the course of
the argument he further claimed that the deceased uttered words to the
effect that if there was to be no honeymoon there would be no wedding.
He said that she then picked up a box containing wedding invitations
and threw it across the room, hitting him on the shoulder. He grabbed
her, asking what she was doing. She screamed and he released her. The
deceased again picked up the box and threw it. He became angry and
moved towards her with the purpose of scaring her. He said that she
grabbed a knife from the kitchen area and told him to ‘back off’,
however he continued to advance. Although he stated he was uncertain
how he sustained the injury, at some stage he sustained a cut to the
little finger of his left hand. He stated that he had no recollection of
what occurred after that time until he found himself on the floor covered
in blood and the deceased lying naked nearby. There was blood
everywhere and the knife was beside him. He was convicted of murder
and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of
10 years.10
When directing the jury in Richardson, and having just spelled out
the elements of murder and manslaughter that they must apply to the
case, the trial judge sought to clarify the issue of intention which he
did by posing a rhetorical question: ‘How may intent be proved in a
court of law?’ As the opening quote to this section illustrates, Hampel
J told them that they were ‘entitled to infer an intent from all the
circumstances, from what a person does, from what they say before,
from what they say afterwards’ (Richardson May 1997: 493). However,
as the above extract also illustrates, judges are prohibited from defining
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intention when directing juries on the law at the same time that intention
is set up as the presumptive standard of responsibility. What makes up
for this paradox, for the ‘invisibility of intention’ is evidence: ‘evidence
provides the contents that are poured into the abstract container of
intention’ (Rush 1997: 283). This insight requires critical reflection on
the implications and effects of the legal process of drawing inferences
from the various and specific forms of evidence that are led at a criminal
trial. The drawing of inferences to delineate the state of mind to prove
murder is, as I will demonstrate, a practice deeply ‘embedded within
the rhetorical practices of legal discourse’ (Young 1998: 445; see also
Goodrich 1987). That is to say, literature is an indelible part of law’s
genre (Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush 2003: 193).11
Through a close reading of the forms of argument deployed in
Richardson, it is possible to discern the extent to which it is the narrative
of the situation that gives the evidence presented at the trial its
plausibility and coherence, and enables the deceased’s words on the
night to become imputed with ideological significance. In Richardson,
evidence was admitted into the trial of the history of the relationship.
There was also evidence admitted of a prior incident that had taken
place six months earlier. On this occasion the defendant had been
drinking and had held the deceased in a headlock causing her to fall to
the ground. A key component of the argument put forward by the
defence was that the relationship between the defendant and deceased
was fraught with problems about finances, particularly as it related to
the wedding and the honeymoon. In addition, the defence sought to
convince the jury that since ‘the headlock incident’, the defendant had
become increasingly fearful that the deceased would leave him. In
contrast, the Crown argued that the defendant was a somewhat
‘immature’ person who ‘simply lost his temper’ on the night he killed
the deceased but that it was not an act done in sufficient provocation to
avail himself of the partial defence. In Richardson, the following
exchange took place during cross-examination between the defence
counsel and a witness who was the mother of the deceased:
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Q: [Witness’ name] is the position this, that [the deceased] was a bright
intelligent woman?
A: Yes.
Q: She was a determined young woman?
A: Not determined, no, if she was — I wouldn’t say determined, she liked
sort of achieving things.
Q: She had in mind things that she wanted to do and she set out to achieve
them?
A: That’s right.
Q: For instance, like buying a block of land and building a home, those
were thoughts that she wanted to implement?
A: That’s right (1997: 35).

In the above exchange, the witness is asked whether she thought
the deceased was a ‘bright’ and ‘intelligent’ person, adjectives that travel
with positive connotations of character. Next, she is asked whether she
thought the deceased was a ‘determined’ person, a proposition the
witness sought to clarify: ‘Not determined, no ... she liked ... achieving
things.’ It isn’t clear at this point whether the line of questioning
demarcated above can be taken as insinuating that the deceased was of
poor character. Nor is it clear that this is a point at which a gap opens
up between the event of murder and the dead body of the deceased
which can only be filled by language.
An important part of the defence argument was that since the
defendant was regularly unemployed, he worked from time to time as
a sub-contractor, the relationship between the defendant and the
deceased was fraught by tensions and problems arising from financial
difficulties. A few moments later in Richardson, another exchange took
place during cross-examination between the defence counsel and the
same witness:
Q: When he visited you, that is [the defendant], he would come there with
your daughter and he really played a very small role in what was
happening in household discussions; he just sat virtually in the
background?
...
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A: He never joined in much at all, he kept in the background, yes.
Q: So he was, if not shy, retiring at least, he didn’t come forward with any
sort of outward signs of involvement?
...
Q: So he would virtually sit there and say very little?
A: He would just talk, like normal talking, like a normal — we would
include him in everything —
Q: I am not suggesting you didn’t but you say he was in the background
in the sense he played very little part in the active conversation that
was going on at various times he was there?
A: That’s right, yes.
D: [Deceased’s name] was the assertive person, is that right? (1997: 37-8)

In this exchange, the witness is encouraged to represent the
defendant through recourse to the relatively innocuous stereotype of
the ‘shy’, ‘retiring’ male. At the same time, the questions asked by the
defence juxtapose two types of character: one, the deceased, who is
represented as the ‘active’ one in the relationship and the other, the
defendant, who is represented as ‘passive’ and ‘quietist’ (the more she
talked the more he just sat ‘in the background’). In the above exchange,
what is being presented for the jury is an image of the deceased as
someone who sought to usurp the position of the male in the relationship
(‘she had in mind things she wanted to do’; ‘she was determined’; she
was ‘active’ in conversation and so on).
This strategy of inviting witnesses to affirm that the deceased had a
‘stronger’ personality than the defendant (was the more ‘assertive’,
‘determined’ and ‘focused’ person) persisted throughout the trial.12 At
one level, this line of questioning is a tactic deployed by the defence to
enable the jury to better understand the situation between the parties
involved in the case. At another level, however, it is an example of the
kind of strategy Young has described as working through ‘implication’
and ‘insinuation’ (1998: 456-7); in this instance, one that enables a
causal link between the deceased’s words and behaviour on the night
and the defendant’s reaction to be established. I suggest that the
witnesses may be quite unaware that their responses to trial questioning
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are assisting the defence narrative to make an incriminating point about
the deceased’s character. The questions asked by the defence squarely
position the deceased as a ‘strong’, ‘determined’ woman who exhibited
all the signs of normal femininity (‘she had a regular job’, she was
‘bright’, ‘hoped to get married’ and so on). It is in this way that the
narrative mobilised by the defence enables an accumulation of
culpability to be attached to the deceased and is what gives the defendant
‘relief’ in the form of a defence (Hachamovitch 1997).
Consider how in Richardson Hampel J’s charge to the jury offers a
highly abridged version of the history of the relationship as narrated
by the defence. This is done in the manner of simply cataloguing the
‘facts’. A number of devices figure in his direction to the jury which
reveal the genre to which the law’s narration of the fatality of the
deceased will ultimately become attached. In his opening remarks,
Hampel J reminds the jury of their obligation to consider the evidence
of the history of the relationship as ‘part of the circumstances’ between
the defendant and deceased ‘up to and on the night’ (Richardson 1997:
485). This is followed by a rehearsal of the history of that relationship
which included an assemblage of matters that were focused upon during
the trial that sought, according to him, ‘first of all’ to emphasise ‘the
good quality of their relationship as a whole’ (Richardson 1997: 495).
In a series of paragraphs that are linked in logical succession, Hampel
J delivers a narrative in which various incidents — one involving
violence described as ‘the headlock incident’ and ‘a general argument’
between the pair six months earlier — are linked with later ones — the
purchase of ‘the block of land’, that they ‘built a house and moved in’
and planned ‘to get married’ — and which render the psychological
impact of what the murdered woman allegedly said and did on the
night in question as significant. Indeed, this discursive device figures
in Hampel J’s subsequent representation of events leading up to the
defendant’s act of killing and the conclusion that he was prepared to
accept the defendant’s account of the event. Hampel J systematically
distils the details and phases of the relationship between the defendant
and deceased in a way that reveals his acceptance that they were brought
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together by voluntary romantic choice. According to his account of the
‘evidence of a number of witnesses’ — which included some who
observed how on the day before the defendant’s act of killing they
were ‘lovey-dovey’, ‘getting on well’ and ‘being affectionate’ (496)
and others who saw them ‘driving’ together and ‘walking the dog’ (4968) — Hampel J invites the jury to concur that these images confirmed
the romantic context in which the killing ultimately took place (he told
them the relationship was ‘on the whole ... a good one, right up to the
evening Joanne died’: 504). By privileging and imputing significance
to the defendant’s version of events, an account which sought to
establish that right up until he killed her ‘they were close and
affectionate’ and were ‘both excited’ about his purchase of ‘two rings’
(504), despite the ‘residual tensions’ between them about the ‘question
of the money, the honeymoon and the wedding’ (497), the jury is made
complicit with one version of events more than the other.
The jury in Richardson returned a verdict of murder. However, the
outcome of the trial is of less consequence than are the implications of
the law’s use and production of a narrative of insult with its key trope
of a woman ‘asking for it’. It is significant that the same sequencing of
events that shaped the defence narrative and drove it forward with an
air of inevitability throughout the trial was redeployed during the plea
in mitigation of sentence. Here, counsel for the defence submitted that
his Honour impose a sentence at the lower range for murder. In his
representation of the details of the history of the relationship between
the defendant and deceased, familiar phases and events are again
subsumed within a chronological sequence in the defence counsel’s
plea. In Richardson, the plea begins:
In … 1992 … they started to live together at premises … he wasn’t working
… they decided, nevertheless, to purchase the block of land and build a
house. In a sense that decision indelibly impressed upon the relationship
with a commitment which ultimately led to the tragic result in many ways
(1997: 564).
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There are a number of devices of narrative at work here. First, events
that occurred in ‘real’ time are recounted in ‘narrative’ time with the
effect that they are assumed to follow a neat formulaic structure:
beginning

>

middle

>

end

couple meet
and commence
living together

>

purchase
of land and
a house

>

the tragic yet
unavoidable
result: murder

Once events have been reorganised within a linear temporal
sequence — a beginning, middle and an end — a sequence of events
or actions take on familiarity and become time dependent as if they
have a ‘natural’ or ‘true’ order (Martin 1986). As Culler points out, a
tendency is to substitute (or confuse) chronology with causation (‘this’
is assumed to cause ‘that’ and so on) (1981: 183). To that extent, the
end of the narrative is accepted as implicit in past events all along.
Moreover, any variations in character or in the imagined motivations
of the defendant do not affect the overall generic structure and
movement of the narrative, which takes on additional significance in
the plea:
They were looking to a happy future ... the debts kept piling up ... They
[were] seen by all and sundry as happy, caring young people ... one, [the
deceased] with ambitions and hopes for the future set upon a home, a family;
the other, [the prisoner], who [was] financially ... way behind the 8th ball
(Richardson 1997: 566).

In the above extract, the audience (the sentencing judge) is
encouraged to identify with both characters (‘they were looking to a
happy future’) and to share their worldview (‘they were seen by all
and sundry as happy, caring young people’). A second narrative device
which is also at work has to do with the genre of the narrative.13 De
Lauretis has explained how in the discourse of romance, the plot that
drives the movement of the narrative towards its conclusion, which is
marriage, is the developing romance between the hero and heroine
despite the heroine’s misgivings about her choice of love object. Thus,
there are only two designated speaking positions for the characters in
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the narrative to occupy. What marks the difference between these two
positions is that there is only one gender assigned to each position: one
for the mythical (male) hero who moves through the ‘plot space’ to
establish differences and norms and the other is that of the immobile
object, obstacle or boundary, which only the hero can cross (1984:
118-19; see also Cranny-Francis 1990). De Lauretis further finds that
whatever its personification, the object (obstacle or boundary) is always
‘morphologically female’ (1984: 119).
In the above extract, note the reference to the deceased as someone
who was ‘set upon a home, a family’. This image of her as indifferent
about their financial situation and its effect on the defendant lends a
certain legitimacy to the defence narrative that the defendant’s fear
that he was losing control over their finances was increasing. A few
moments later, his defence counsel submitted:
In the last six months he worked on and off. The financial problems were
increasing ... the bills were growing and the arguments grew, doors were
slammed and voices raised, but never resort to violence ... They lived
together. They had been as man and wife. ... The desire by my client to
marry seems to grow ... The arguments became more frequent as the funds
seemed to grow less (Richardson 1997: 567).

What is being put into effect here takes place through a discursive
process of distortion. The transcript literalises the defendant’s fear of
rising debt in order to make an incriminating point about the effect of
the deceased’s words on the night in question. This is done through a
process of analogy and the juxtaposition of images designed to give
the impression that the situation between the two of them was building
up into a crescendo (the ‘bills were growing’ as were the ‘arguments’
and the volume of their ‘voices’). Once the various phases of the
relationship and events have been reordered within a discrete
chronological series, the causal logic gains momentum and the
deceased’s words on the night are understood as the calcifying moment
in the narrative. In a final move that invests the defence narrative with
a degree of legitimacy and, to paraphrase Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush,
which reveals the genre of sentence to which the law’s narration of the

297

Tyson

fatality of the deceased is to become attached (2003: 197), Hampel J’s
sentencing remarks culminate in a succinct reconstruction of the
romantic context in which the event of murder is understood to have
taken place:
It is not only a tragic case, but it is a bizarre case in many respects. It is one
which is unusual in my experience. Most cases have a background of
violence, hate, jealousy, and misplaced possessiveness. This does not appear
to have any of those features. What occurred, therefore, is very difficult to
understand. That does not excuse it, but it places it in an unusual category
of cases. ... [this was] basically a good, loving relationship (Richardson
1997: 591).

The above passage illustrates the claim by Philadelphoff-Puren and
Rush that the contexts that come before the courts are not as determinate
as law’s appeals to fact would suggest (2003: 202). Rather than assume
that context reflects a given state of affairs, they are produced, thus the
process of judgment ‘is brought into relationship with the sign of
literature in a range of ways’ (Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush 2003:
202-3).14 In shifting the literary frame to the genre of tragedy (‘It is not
only a tragic case, but it is a bizarre case in many respects ... [this was]
basically a good, loving relationship’), Hampel J activates a range of
positive attributes of character that include chivalry and honour and
that become attached to the defendant and which constitute his act as a
legitimate attempt to defend against loss (of his self-image and also his
masculinity).15 It is the discursive proximity between the literary frame
that shapes the narrative of the situation, which comes from the genre
of romance with its entwined themes of tragedy and fate, and the defence
narrative, that the event of murder in Richardson ends up rewritten as
the inevitable culmination of a ‘romance-gone-wrong’.16
Similarly, at Leonboyer’s first trial, the defendant and his counsel
mobilised a narrative of insult. Yet, it is used here to negate culpability
for murder and, in the alternative, to argue for a reduction in culpability
for murder (Leonboyer May 1999). That is, the standard provocation
narrative that is typically used by a man to tell the tale that he was
‘provoked’ by ‘a nagging, unfaithful or departing wife’ (Howe 2002:
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61; see also Tyson 1999), is used here to achieve another albeit different
outcome. In the discussion below, what will emerge is that the narrative
of insult that is used by the defendant and his lawyer to argue for a
reduction in culpability is one that is gendered or sexed, and can be
stretched across law’s representation of the ‘facts’ to satisfy the rules
and requirements of a different question of legal doctrine which is
automatism.

Wounded men or the wounds of judgment?
Provocation, automatism and the
two trials of Leonboyer
The predicament of judgement is that it writes. Before anything is done, in
law as in Julius Caesar, there is a text. ... The questions which circumscribe
the limits of our reading can thus be stated. ... Into what kind of sign, what
genre of sentence will the law make his death? (Philadelphoff-Puren and
Rush 2003: 197).

In Leonboyer, the defendant and his lawyer claimed that her (the
deceased) saying to him that she could fuck anyone she wanted to
fuck, that she had been fucking someone else, which she followed
with a taunt in Spanish to the effect that ‘he did it better than you did’
delivered ‘a psychological blow’ that caused his mind to dissociate
(‘split’) (May 1999). In doctrinal terms, the mentality that is the concern
of the defence of automatism is one that causes a defendant to commit
an action that is both conscious and voluntary, but that he was not
aware of committing at the time.17 If successfully argued, the defendant
is acquitted of the crime of murder. In the alternative, the defence raised
the defence of provocation. In contrast, the Crown case against the
defendant was to argue that the defendant knew what he was doing on
the night he killed the deceased, he stabbed her ‘in a fit of anger and
jealousy ... [and] ... to inflict the ultimate punishment’ (Leonboyer
Opening Address to Jury by Crown May 1999: 104). Thus, the jury
should find him guilty of murder rather than manslaughter. Some
examples from the transcript of Leonboyer’s first trial will serve to
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illustrate the legal process of positioning the defendant and deceased
within a narrative of insult. My aim is to show how the process of
judgment operates not only to delineate the state of mind to prove
murder, but also delivers a narrative which discovers the cause of male
violence in a past history of masculine crisis.
In the representation by the defence counsel of the details of the
defendant’s narrative, the jury is offered a version of the history of the
relationship between the defendant and the deceased. From the very
beginning of the trial in Leonboyer, the jury were told things that are
crucial to the subsequent formulaic structure of that narrative:
[T]hese two were apparently a happy couple as far as [he] was concerned.
... they met, they went to sign a lease and put the bond down on a flat that
they were going to occupy together and live as man and wife ... they intended
to have a full relationship, as far as this man was concerned ... they went
home, had a meal and watched television in each others arms ... what
appeared to be a happy, joyous couple, ten minutes later there were over
20 stab wounds ... something happened to his mind that resulted in what
can only be described as a frenzied act (Opening Address to Jury by Defence
May 1999: 115).

In the above extract, the defence narrative locates the cause of the
death of the deceased within the context or circumstances of the
relationship. They were a ‘happy, joyous couple’ who had a history
together and one that importantly had a future: ‘they went to sign a
lease ... live together as man and wife’. As in Richardson discussed
above, it is significant that the accused and female deceased are depicted
as having been brought together by voluntary romantic choice. Note
also how the deceased’s desire is consumed within and according to
the defendant’s point of view: ‘these two were apparently a happy couple
... they intended to have a full relationship, as far as this man was
concerned’. As in the case of Richardson, the defence narrative in
Leonboyer maintains a discursive proximity to the discourse of romance,
which as Puren reminds us, gives primacy to the male subject’s
progression through the narrative whereas the female subject’s
utterances and desire in this masculinist economy do not figure in quite
the same way (1995: 21).
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In his opening remarks to the jury, the defence submitted that
although the ‘confession of adultery’ was ‘stressful, traumatic and
dramatic, by itself it did not cause the state of automatism’ (Leonboyer
May 1999: 114-15). Crucial to the strategy adopted by the defence
was the claim that despite its ‘happy’ outward appearance, the
relationship between the defendant and the deceased was fraught with
tension and anxiety arising from the deceased’s duplicitous behaviour.
The narrative mobilised by the defence sought to present Leonboyer’s
response as culturally specific.18 An example can be found during crossexamination between the defence counsel and a witness who was the
mother of the deceased. The defence asked the witness to confirm
whether she and her boyfriend regularly attended the same nightclubs
as her daughter. The witness replied in the affirmative. Next he invited
the witness to clarify her age, which she did (she was 39), and that of
her daughter (who was 18 at the time). A few moments later, this
exchange was followed with a proposition: ‘[The accused] said to you,
did he not, that he didn’t like [the deceased] dancing with those older
Colombians?’ to which the witness responded ‘Yes’ (Leonboyer May
1999: 341). At this point in the defence narrative, the witness may
have been quite unaware that the suggestion by the defence that she
somehow failed to cite the norms of motherhood because she regularly
socialised with her daughter and ‘those older Columbians’, would later
underwrite the manner in which her daughter’s words on the night
would become imputed with ideological significance. Some further
examples from the transcript of Leonboyer serve to highlight how the
defence narrative sought to render the psychological impact of the
wound from the deceased’s words on the night as culturally significant.
Throughout the trial, it had been repeatedly emphasised for the jury
by both counsel that in the months leading up to the night in question
the defendant was under a lot of stress due to being in the final stages
of a law degree. In a further move designed to lend plausibility and
coherence and, more importantly, the weight of authority and objectivity
to the sequencing of events as represented by the defence narrative,
counsel led evidence from a number of expert witnesses. In one

301

Tyson

exchange during cross-examination between the defence and a medical
practitioner who was also a psychiatrist, the witness was asked whether
he accepted ‘the proposition that a mind can be made more vulnerable
by pre-existing stresses, psychological stresses, so that one final blow
will break the camel’s back’ (Leonboyer May 1999: 528). At one level,
the deployment of metaphor; in this instance, ‘the straw that broke the
camel’s back’, enables legal practitioners to convey everyday meaning.
But as a number of writers have commented, it is a linguistic technique
that has the capacity ‘to influence the apparent logic of a situation’
(Facchini and Grossman 1999: 216). To that extent, certain associative
metaphors have the capacity to dictate the organisation of entire
discourses (Young 1997: 66-7).
A few moments later, this same witness was invited to reflect
whether he could ‘conceive of situations where, if someone was
sufficiently vulnerable and had been under sufficient stress ... the
revelation of sexual infidelity ... may cause that person to dissociate’
(Leonboyer May 1999: 532)? The witness conceded: ‘In an automatic
manner, yes’. In another exchange between the defendant and his lawyer
during the making of his unsworn statement, the defendant was asked
whether he spoke Spanish at home to which he replied, ‘always ... with
his mother’ (Leonboyer May 1999: 612). The defendant was then asked
whether as a child he had played a Spanish flamenco instrument,
whereupon the defendant replied that he did, and explained that it was
‘played by beating a drum’ (Leonboyer May 1999: 612). In a manner
similar to that in Richardson, we can see the deployment of key tropes
of masculine loss that enable the event to be rewritten in a way that
sets up the defendant’s reaction as caused by a build up of stresses and
anxieties over a period of time and that are construed as culturally
specific. An example to illustrate can be found during examination
between the prosecuting counsel and an expert witness, who was a
practising psychiatrist, medical practitioner and professor of psychiatry
at the University of Melbourne:
Q: But the going and getting and the using of the knife in the context of
this case has but one purpose, doesn’t it?
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A: Well, the knife was used for one purpose, yes.
Q: In circumstances where there existed a very powerful motive to want
to hurt?
A: Yes.
...
Q: That his reaction to that, I’m putting to you, isn’t particularly unusual
or out of the ordinary; we don’t know how people respond in those
situations.
A: We weren’t there that is why it is a high probability, but I was interested
in the stab movements because he actually plays a percussion drum
and that involves a rapid movement (indicating), and I mean this is
just theoretical because I wasn’t there...
...
Q: You see, at the very least, it is well directed violence, isn’t it?
A: Well, we don’t know what else it was directed at, but yes, it would
appear to be well directed violence, isn’t it (Leonboyer May 1999:
689-90).

In the above exchange, the witness concedes that the defendant’s
reaction to what the deceased is alleged to have said on the night may
well be ‘directed’ and ‘purposeful’ but he submits it was a ‘high
probability’ that the ‘stab movements’ were analogous to those involved
when a person (in this instance, the defendant) ‘plays a percussion
drum’ (which also ‘involves a rapid movement’). Earlier, counsel for
the defence had introduced evidence for the jury informing them of
the kinds of ‘matters’ likely to be important to men whose masculinity
is linked to images of Chilean culture despite the fact that they have
lived in Australia from a very young age (including ‘the roles of male,
female relationships’ and ‘religious aspects’ of that culture) (Leonboyer
May 1999: 535).19 What is also at stake, however, is that this narrative
of the background context in which the defendant’s act of killing the
deceased is assumed to take place is replete with cultural and relativistic
assumptions about the masculinities of men associated with ‘hotblooded’ cultures that are seen as clinging to an outdated form of
hegemonic masculinity.20 At one level, this line of questioning adopted
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by the defence is intended to establish for the jury that the defendant’s
vulnerable psychological state was a permanent rather than transient
or fleeting characteristic to be attached to the hypothetical ordinary
man when dealing with the overriding legal requirement that must be
satisfied before the defence of provocation can be made out. However,
it is this narrative of the background context that must be stretched to
fit the legal chronology of automatism. To that extent, the defence
narrative must put into effect a putative chain of causation between the
defendant’s reaction on the night and the words allegedly spoken by
the murdered woman.
In his charge to the jury, Hampel J’s rehearsal of the evidence
summed up the case for the defence in a manner that lends the defence
narrative an air of legitimacy. On the issue of provocation, he told
them that although the prosecuting counsel had argued that the law in
this area was ‘contradictory or inconsistent’, he did not find this to be
the case (783). He said that when the evidence was looked at as a
whole, ‘there is not very much in dispute about the background and
the circumstances of the relationship. There may be a slight difference
in emphasis but generally the issues are fairly clear’ (785). When
considering the ‘ultimate question’ they were to decide in the case,
‘What was the state of mind of the accused?’, he told them they were
to have regard for the:
longitudinal picture ... [including] ... the background manifestations,
incidents, relationship, comings and goings, tensions, stressors, all those
matters ... starting from the childhood events to the other incident I’ve
already mentioned’ (Leonboyer Charge to Jury: 785).

In a final move Hampel J offers the jury a succinct version of the
defence narrative. Recounting the narrative for the defence, which
‘talked about their relationship in the context of their culture’, he next
invited the jury to consider:
the operation of factors such as the change in their relationship, the intensity
of his studies, the final confrontation with the father, the ‘new vision’ as he
called it with Sandra, and it is in that context, he argued, that you should
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look at the degree of the psychological blow produced before he stabbed
her. He asked you to consider it was much more than just a mere admission
of infidelity, it was a breakdown of his whole structure (Leonboyer May
1999: 787).

Moving to Leonboyer’s second trial (the case observed), although
Cummins J conceded that ‘the door [was] not fully closed to words
alone being sufficient in appropriate circumstances to constitute
provocation ... [in this case] ... To allow provocation to be left with the
jury ... would be to significantly extend the law of provocation’. It is
also significant that when sentencing Leonboyer, Cummins J chose to
remark that he believed the defendant’s account of events on the night
to be ‘false’ (R v Leonboyer [1999] VSC 422: [6]). He further stated :
After I had ruled as a matter of law that provocation did not arise in this
case, your senior counsel spoke … of ‘political correctness’. That wearying
cliché has no place in the legal lexicon … The law does not excuse from
liability the murderous conduct of a man who in anger cuts down a woman
because he is told of her infidelity (R v Leonboyer [1999] VSC 422: [7]).

In a recent article that explores the differential treatment given by
Victorian trial judges to ‘evidence of provocation’ and in a comment
about this decision by Cummins J to withdraw the defence of
provocation from the jury,21 McSherry submits how this ‘demonstrates
an attempt to delineate the boundaries of the defence of provocation in
circumstances of intimate homicides’ (2006: 13). In this
acknowledgement of the potential for trial judges to perform an
important ‘gatekeeping role’ when assessing men’s claims of
provocation to argue for a reduction in culpability for killing their
current or estranged female partners, McSherry is sceptical of such
decisions that can all too often end up overturned by the Court of Appeal
and result in a retrial. Further, McSherry raises the question, whether
the context of a breakdown of the relationship should ever be a sufficient
ground to negate or avoid culpability for murder (2005: 15). Taking a
slightly different tact, what I have offered here is a rereading of the
values and assumptions that underpin the plot structure that underscores
the narrative of insult mobilised in such cases to provide an account
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context as a text. This insight, borrowed from Culler, points to the act
of framing (which hints of the ‘frame-up’) as something that we all do
(1988: ix). What I hope to have achieved here is an account of how the
law’s use and production of a narrative of insult is not confined to the
domain of provocation. I have further demonstrated the extent to which
it is the narrative that discovers the claim to the significance of those
events and which occurs as a result of those events having met certain
discursive requirements. That is to say, once an unrelated series of
events are listed within a linear temporal sequence, a putative chain of
causation between what the deceased said on the night and the event of
murder is established. It is in this sense that I understand the defendant’s
act of killing can end up understood as a final episode within a
chronological series and as if his act of killing the deceased was
imminent in those past events all along. What makes up for the
invisibility of intention is evidence conveyed through its content but
also, and more crucially, its narrative form (White 1987).

Conclusion: The death of a defence?
Provocation’s narratives and their afterlife ...
Rereading, an operation contrary to the commercial and ideological habits
of our society, which would have us ‘throw away’ the story once it has
been consumed ... so that we can then move on to another story, buy another
book ... rereading is here suggested at the outset, for it alone saves the text
from repetition (those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story
everywhere) (Barthes cited in Felman 1981: 19).

The moment of homicide law reform calls these issues again into
question. At centre stage of another scene of judgment is the claim that
legal practitioners in a criminal justice context have tended to unfairly
privilege men’s reasons for killing their intimate partners by allowing
them to argue they were provoked to reduce culpability. Specifically, a
key focus of reform efforts has been on the inability of legal rules that
structure the doctrines of the defences to homicide to accommodate
and adequately reflect the different circumstances in which men and
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women tend to kill (for example Morgan 2002, Graycar and Morgan
2005). Such efforts have been crucial to a feminist legal strategy of
ensuring that the criminal courts are more responsive to, and reflective
of, the reality of women’s lives. A perhaps unintended effect of the
move to privilege different forms of knowledge in legal (and also
feminist) reasoning22 is the presumption that context reflects a given
state of affairs, that it is possible to control the contexts in which legal
texts take on meaning. This is not to ignore the importance and necessity
of growing critical attention to the contexts in which women kill their
abusive male partners. Rather, a key concern in this article has been
with what Goodrich describes as the effect of truth in a given context,
with what seems to be true for a given audience (1986: 179-80).
The controversial outcome in the Victorian case of Ramage23
coincided with the release of the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s
Defences to Homicide: Final Report (VLRC 2004). The VLRC’s report
endorsed an approach to reforming the defences to homicide as outlined
in an earlier Occasional Paper Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking
Beyond Legal Categories by Professor Jenny Morgan (VLRC 2002).
The VLRC acknowledged the law’s role in failing to adequately respond
to the gendered circumstances or contexts in which men and women
kill their intimate partners. The VLRC recommended that ‘these two
circumstances ... should not be seen as comparable’ and resolved that
continued use of the provocation defence to homicide no longer
reflected modern concerns and realities particularly in the domestic
sphere (2004: xxv). In late 2005, the Victorian Government recognised
this and announced its intention to implement key legislative changes
to the criminal law, which resulted in the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005
(Vic) (Media Release 4 October 2005). At the level of law’s narrative
retelling of this homicide situation, a dominant and socially harmful
effect of these attitudes has been to promote and perpetuate a culture
of ‘blaming the victim’ (VLRC 2004: 32). To this extent, the changes
to Victorian homicide law are about recognition of the need for a
gendered response on the part of the criminal law in cases of domestic
homicide.24
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Indeed, a perceived benefit of shifting the telling of provocation’s
narratives to the sentencing stage is that it gives greater flexibility to
judges about which sentence to impose (VLRC 2004: 33; see also NZLC
2001: 41). As numerous critical studies have documented, however,
the tendency for judicial attitudes to reveal sympathy for men’s
motivations for killing their current or former female sexual partners
(for example out of jealousy, a need for control or due to a breakdown
in the relationship) and impose a dramatically reduced sentence may
well persist (Coss 2006: 149-50, see also Morgan 1997, Cote, Sheehy
and Majury 2000, Tyson 2002, Burton 2003, Strange 2003, Howe 2004,
McSherry 2005, Coss 2005, Maher et al 2005). This has led to a degree
of scepticism as to the benefits of banning the use of the provocation
defence among academic and policy audiences, which is of concern.
What remains is to thoroughly examine provocation’s narratives post
abolition of the defence in cases of domestic homicide which, I have
argued here, operate to reproduce a dominant ideology and aesthetic
of sexual difference according to the values of law. However, a point
well raised by one commentator is worth noting:
[T]his is not to imply that judges, or indeed defence counsel, are consciously
and actively biased against women. Rather it reminds us that our conceptual
frameworks are limited by what we are familiar with, that we are governed
by habit; these patterns are institutional habits reproduced over time
(Morgan 2002: 42).

There is little doubt that these institutional habits that have been
reproduced over time are going to be hard to break. A key issue that
needs to be further explored therefore is whether banning the use of
the provocation defence to homicide will be sufficient to prevent the
repetition of a key victim-blaming narrative with its duality of feminine
excess and masculine loss (a narrative of insult) across discursive sites.25
If we follow Mohanty, then the question of law reform ought not merely
to be one of ‘acknowledging difference; rather, the more difficult
question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and
engaged’ (1989-1990: 181). To return to the opening quote of this article,
the disaster of all murder trials is that the dead body cannot speak, as
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Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush testify, the wounds of the dead body
remain intransitive until attached to statements, a statement about who
did what to whom (2003: 197). This then is the paradox of judgment. If
it is writing, literature, that is part of law’s genre, then at the very least
a critical strategy of law reform26 ought to entail re-reading for as Barthes
reminds us ‘it alone saves the text from repetition (those who fail to
reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere)’ (cited in Felman
1981: 19).

Notes
1

My sincere thanks to the editors of the Special Issue and the anonymous
referees for their extremely helpful comments, to Alison Young who read
earlier versions of this article, and to my dear friend and interlocutor,
Rebecca Scott Bray, for her generous important conversations and
invaluable suggestions that were crucial to the final version.

2

Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush (2003: 192) state that ‘[t]he conventional
name for this passage from the corpse’ to the legal decision is judgment.

3

Only a few moments earlier, his Honour had reasoned with counsel for the
defence that ‘what was capable of provoking an ordinary person many
years ago is not necessarily that which in 1997 is capable of provoking an
ordinary person’ and had warned that ‘[c]oncepts of domestic violence,
concept of male ownership of females, concepts of male control over
females have changed’ (Leonboyer Nov 1999: 1146).

4

R v Richardson Supreme Court of Victoria Trial Transcript Hampel J 15
May 1997 – 30 May 1997 (hereinafter Richardson 1997).

5

R v Leonboyer Supreme Court of Victoria Trial Transcript Hampel J 3
May 1999 – 18 May 1999 (hereinafter Leonboyer May 1999); R v Leonboyer
Supreme Court of Victoria Trial Transcript per Cummins J 4 October 1999
– 6 November 1999 (hereinafter Leonboyer Nov 1999).

6

On the deployment of the literary concept of plot as enabling law to conduct
its own reasoning see Philadelphoff-Puren 2005 and Philadelphoff-Puren
and Rush 2003; on the relationship between rape and romance more
generally, see Larcombe 2005.

7

This summary of the facts is drawn from DPP v Richardson [1998] 2 VR
188: 189-90.
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8

See his Honour’s ruling in DPP v Leonboyer [1999] VSC 450 (20 October
1999): 3-4 where he resolved that nearly all the authoritative cases involve
not only words but actions. On the question of whether words alone could
amount to provocation, he reasoned that although this was sufficient basis
on which to go to a jury on the subjective criterion, there was insufficient
material to go to a jury on the objective criterion.

9

My argument follows and is similar to that of Young: ‘[s]uch a reading will
suggest how law operates to judge the abused woman who kills [and, as I
will argue, the murdered woman], not merely in terms of the formal
doctrines of the criminal law, but also through recourse to the laws of
gender difference’ 1997: 128.

10 The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the sentence on the
ground that it was, in the public interest, manifestly inadequate. The Court
of Appeal allowed the appeal and the sentence was increased to 17½ years
with a non-parole period of 12½ years. See DPP v Richardson [1998] 2
VR 188: 189.
11 On the law and literature movement, see White 1973; on trial discourse as
narrative, see Nash 1990, Papke 1991 and Kaspiew 1995; for literature on
legal storytelling, see Scheppele 1989.
12 See, for example, Richardson 1997: 83, 123.
13 According to Frow’s formulation, genre is more than simply a ‘stylistic
device’. It provides the audience with ‘a framework for processing
information and for allowing us to move between knowledge given directly
in a text and other sets of knowledge that are relevant to understanding it’
2005: 80. On the theme of genre and gender in French literature, see
Freadman 1997.
14 These include the techniques of literature including citation, plot, rhetoric,
genre and concept.
15 On the theme of masculinity and the threat of its loss in criminal trials
involving men who plead provocation, see Lunny 2003.
16 For a fuller discussion of how the discourse of romance maintains a complex
connection with legal representations of rape, see Philadelphoff-Puren 2005.
17 For an altogether different reading of how the criminal law takes into account
fleeting mental states such as dissociation in response to extraordinary
stress (automatism) and loss of self-control in provocation, see Yannoulidis
2005.
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18 For a similar discussion of how discourses of the prosecution, the defence
and the judge represent such cases as an ‘honour killing’, see Maher et al
2005.
19 Counsel for the defence also sought to lead evidence of a Senior Lecturer
in Sociology at the University of New South Wales whose area of expertise
was with how second generation migrants ‘invest and, indeed, over-invest
in relationships that they have between, or with their family and with others’.
However, his Honour ruled the evidence inadmissible, see Leonboyer May
1999: 639-44.
20 On the salience of using the professional discourse of law to indirectly
authorise ‘tradition’, ‘belief’ and ‘honour’ in cases involving minority men
who seek to rely on evidence of their cultural background to reduce or
negate criminal liability for murder, see Volpp 1994, Koptiuch 1996, Phillips
2003. For a discussion of the ideological assumptions about masculinity
underpinning men’s claims to the provocation defence in Victoria, Australia,
see Maher et al 2005.
21 The jury convicted him of murder and he was sentenced to 18 years’
imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years. See R v Leonboyer
[1999] VSC 422 (5 November 1999). The applicant later lodged an
application to appeal against conviction (on the ground that the learned
trial judge erred in failing to leave the issue of provocation for determination
by the jury) and against sentence. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal
against conviction (by a two to three majority with Callaway JJA dissenting),
but granted the appeal against sentence which was reduced to 15 years’
imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years. See R v Leonboyer
[2001] VSCA 149 (7 September 2001).
22 For a discussion of the use of social science research in law, see Monahan
and Walker 1988; on the ambivalence that surrounds the use of expert
evidence in cases involving ‘battered women’, see Sheehy, Stubbs and
Tolmie 1992 and Schuller, Wells and Rzepa 2004.
23 At least two books have been published in response to the case, see Cleary
2000 and Kissane 2005.
24 The recently implemented changes to Victorian homicide law are intended
to address the issue of gender bias in the criminal law in a range of ways.
First, reforms to the substantive law of homicide, including reforms to the
laws of evidence, clarification of the defence of self-defence, and the
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introduction of a new offence of ‘defensive homicide’ aim to better account
for the homicide situation in which a woman kills her partner, usually a
male, in response to a past history of abuse perpetrated against her by the
deceased. Secondly, removal of the defence of provocation is intended to
address a perceived injustice in the way judicial attitudes have tended to
reveal sympathy for men who kill women who are said to have used words
to ‘provoke’ them.
25 On the law’s use and production of a narrative of insult in provocation
cases, see Tyson 1999, 2002. On the concept of ‘social injury’ and the idea
that provocation’s narratives can posthumously harm all women, see Howe
2004: 74-5.
26 On the theme and theory of a poetics of law reform, see PhiladelphoffPuren 2004 and Golder 2004.
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